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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

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1. The Congo Republic developments and the Soviet reaction to them gave no clear indication that Moscow was contemplating the dispatch of troops to the new African state. Premier Lumumba's press conference of July 20 was reported briefly in the Soviet press, without comment on his request for Soviet troops. Earlier in the week Khrushchev's message informing Lumumba of the dispatch of a Soviet food shipment seemed rather anti-climactic coming on the heels of his July 15 message to the Congolese Premier promising the "necessary help which maybe needed for the victory of your just cause," and the July 13 Soviet statement on the situation in Congo.

In the course of the week, Soviet propaganda developed growing criticism of the UN action in Congo, and of the role of Secretary General Hammarskjold and Under-Secretary Bunche. An Izvestiya (July 20) "Observer" article charged that Hammarskjold's "more than strange" position seemed designed more to support the Belgian "aggressors" than implement the Security Council July 14 resolution. A bitterly hostile article in the same paper the following day in effect accused Bunche of being an agent of the US Government rather than a UN official. The objective of the Soviet moves and propaganda accompaniment was evidently to present the USSR as a vigilant guardian of Congolese independence in the face of "imperialist" machinations under a UN cover. (Gromyko's July 19 statement on the presence of 20 US military personnel in Congo further illustrated this approach.) On the key question of the dispatch of troops, however, the Soviets seemed to be picking a careful path, suggesting that there was a possibility of such a step but avoiding anything in the nature of a firm public commitment.

2. Cuba: The most striking development of the week in Soviet reaction to the Cuban issue has been the gradual retreat of the USSR from the exposed position it assumed with Khrushchev's rocket threat. Although early in the week the threat was repeated by the press, mainly by quotation of Cuban statements, it was absent from the July 18 TASS declaration attacking the Monroe Doctrine, and most notably, from the July 21 joint Khrushchev-Castro communique. The communique, issued at the conclusion of Raul Castro's four day surprise visit to Moscow, minimized the likelihood of US armed attack on Cuba by referring to the US disavowal of such action as a public commitment to the entire world, redefined both the threat to Cuba and the countermeasures called for in such a way as to make the threat almost irrelevant to the situation, and cast the USSR in the role of a politico-economic rather more than a military supporter of Cuba.

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At the same time both the TASS declaration and the communique signalled Soviet intention to mobilize public pressures by strikes, demonstrations and other disorders throughout Latin America in an attempt to block possible governmental actions against Cuba.

Consideration of the Cuban issue by the Security Council received the usual exclusively one-sided Soviet press coverage and the referral of the problem to the OAS was briefly condemned as an evasion of responsibility.

3. Ideological Dispute. The July 16 Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on the results of the Bucharest meeting of representatives of bloc communist parties indicated that the ideological debate with Peiping has not abated and may have become sharper.

The most striking feature of the adoption of formal CPSU views on this subject is that they were presented to the Central Committee in an as yet unpublished report by Kozlov, although Kozlov was not a member of the Soviet delegation to Bucharest. The purpose of this manoeuver may have been to spread responsibility to the entire CPSU Central Committee for Soviet views on the current international situation, which in the public mind possibly are overly identified with Khrushchev.

The Resolution refers to the existence of dogmatist and left sectarian deviations, which were not mentioned in the Bucharest communique. Although Peiping of course was not identified as the source of these deviations, this will be readily assumed throughout the bloc. The characterization of divergent views as deviations in a formal CPSU document gives further gravity to the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, since deviations by Leninist tradition cannot be accommodated and must be purged.

The Resolution also speaks of the necessity to "relax international tensions," which in the context of the current ideological dispute is believed to mean the necessity of holding negotiations with the US and which evidently is opposed by the Chicoms. This phrase, although prominent in all recent discussions of the international situation by Soviet spokesmen, did not appear in the jointly-agreed language of the Bucharest communique. The fact that it shows up strongly in the CPSU Resolution tends to confirm that it lies at the center of Sino-Soviet disagreement.

The Resolution gave heavy stress to the need for bloc unity, implying that this is a problem for Moscow. This and other salient features of the Resolution have been repeated several times by Suslov and other Presidium members in speeches delivered since the Resolution was published.

4. The trial of Francis Powers, the pilot of the U-2 shot down near Sverdlovsk May 1, was set for August 17 before the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, according to a Soviet July 18 announcement.

5. The US announcement on nuclear tests over the next two years was reported briefly and without comment in Pravda (July 19). There was no follow-up comment as of the end of the week.

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6. Party Plenum - Role of Khrushchev: Available information concerning the work of the July 13-16 CPSU Central Committee Plenum is relatively much more incomplete, probably deliberately so, than materials made available for the last three "expanded" plenums on industrial or agricultural themes. Concluding a day earlier than anticipated, apparently without a major speech by KHRUSHCHEV himself, the plenum served not only as a forum for citing industrial achievements and rallying the nation for a still more intensified industrial effort but apparently also as one to "discuss" and "approve" Soviet ideological positions on foreign policy, bloc relationships and related topics. The political speech by Party Secretary F. R. KOZLOV the last day "On the Results of the Conference of Representatives of Fraternal Parties in Bucharest" has not been published, many of the other plenum speeches were not published in full, and there has been no indication thus far whether a "stenographic transcript" similar to those published following the last three "expanded" plenums can be expected.

Aside from a note that Khrushchev had opened the plenum, the published plenum materials were silent as to his actual role there, nor did any of his usual interjections and "penetrating" comments appear in the speech texts. On the other hand, many of the speakers addressed quite lavish praise to him personally, and there have subsequent indication that his performance may not have differed substantially from his usual practice. Thus, Pravda of July 19 carried two items by low-level plenum participants which suggested an active role by Khrushchev. In one, a factory shop party secretary said he would tell his fellows "about the great joy caused me and the other participants by the deep and clear instructions of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. With what true Leninist simplicity and straightforwardness, with what exceptional knowledge of the matter he directed the work of the Plenum!"

Moscow Pravda of the same day, reviewing a plenum "diary" kept by a worker-guest at the plenum, said (under the July 14 entry) that he "describes how the work of the plenum is going, how keenly the statements of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev act on everyone, what interesting questions he poses to the orators."

7. Voroshilov Released from Presidium: The only two party personnel actions announced at the conclusion of the plenum are of a nature which would not, in themselves, have necessitated a restricted or executive session of the Central Committee. The release of L. I. BREZHNEV from the Secretariat in connection with his appointment in May to head the Supreme Soviet Presidium seems a routine formalization of the existing situation. K. Ye. VOROSHILOV's releast "at his personal request" from membership in the Presidium has been anticipated ever since his replacement as Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman by Brezhnev (also "at his personal request"). Although the 79-year-old Voroshilov may continue to have some ceremonial-protocol role as a member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, it seems, in effect, that he has been simply allowed to retire, an action apparently novel in Soviet history for a member of the top Party circle.

8. Post-Plenum Leadership Activity: The impression of a more collective "collective leadership" which had been fostered to a degree by the playing down or concealment of Khrushchev's role at the plenum and his leaving the delivery of the more important party-government spokesmen speeches to his deputies KOZLOV and A.N. KOSYGIN received further support from the post-plenum leadership activity. When the full Presidium gathered for a leadership-intelligentsia "social" at a country home Sunday, July 17, M. A. SUSLOV rather than Khrushchev was reported as having been main spokesman for the day although talks and/or toasts were delivered also by L. I. BREZHNEV, KOZLOV, A.I.MIKOYAN, Ye. A. FURTSEVA, A.B. ARISTOV, Kosygin and Khrushchev, in that order, on the Presidium side. Here again, the press report of the party treated Khrushchev's participation with more than usual restraint and only one of his informal remarks was quoted, although it was quite apparent, generally, and from the published photographs, that he was the main focus of interest at the occasion. As in the case of the plenum, there also were subsequent comments (Pravda of July 19) by guests who waxed eloquent over his inspiring statements and behavior; suggesting a role much more active than indicated by the press account.

Again on the following day, July 18, the Party leadership, excepting O.V. KUUSINEN, Suslov, Furtseva, N. M. SHVERNIK and M.G. PERVUKHIN formed Khrushchev's entourage during a "collective" visit to model home demonstrating new construction materials and methods. By July 19, the available leadership group had dwindled to where Khrushchev had only Brezhnev, Kozlov, Kosygin, Mikoyan

and D. S. POLYANSKIY with him during an inspection visit to the Moscow ring road by-pass under construction.

Of possible additional interest in connection with the deliberate fostering of an impression of "collective" leadership, the candidate members of the Presidium present on the model home visit were listed alphabetically in the press report the following day, a departure from the usual listing of P. M. POSPELOV first and D. S. KOROTCHENKO second, with the remainder in alphabetical order. This change was all the more striking since the standard listing appeared on the very same page of most July 19 papers (which, except for Pravda and Izvestia do not have Monday editions) in the reports of the leadership's social gathering with the intelligentsia July 17.

9. Vigilance against Espionage: The current rash of Soviet articles relating ione way or another to the need for vigilance against foreign espionage activities in the Soviet Union lends some credence to a rumor that a Central Committee directive or message for the intensification of vigilance and security control was transmitted some weeks ago to local party organs throughout the USSR. (That this may well have taken place as long ago as mid-June or earlier is suggested by the appearance at that time of a major vigilance article in Agitator No. 12 - see WEEKA No. 26 of June 24. As in recent months, an increasing portion of the current vigilance propaganda seems aimed directly or by implication at diplomats, military attaches, tourists, students, exchange delegation members, scientists, sportsmen, businessmen and other persons from the "capitalist states" visiting or temporarily residing in the USSR.

The LANGELLE case was brought up as an example of espionage under diplomatic "cover" by articles in the July 19 Trud and in the July 20 issue of Soviet Russia. The latter article also described how a mixed group of unidentified foreign embassy personnel, travelling by train from Moscow to Kurgan in January 1960, allegedly were caught secretly photographing and taking notes on military and industrial objectives, and how supposed spies included in a western aircraft companies' delegation stole metal shavings and collected other "intelligence information" while visiting Soviet aircraft factories. One of the three examples portrayed of improper or disgusting foreign tourist behavior in a most unpleasant article in the latest issue of the "humor" magazine Krokodil (No.20 of July 20). involved a West German spy-tourist caught photographing a factory. (This example was given in support of the second of three recommended "rules of conduct" for "some tourists from capitalist countries", which stated "it is not recommended that you stick your nose or camera lens into the keyholes of the few doors which are closed to you." (In this connection, an American student in Leningrad has reported being told by a Soviet student of a statement

made by a lecturer before a Leningrad military school audience alleging that American students in the USSR are spies who have buttonhole cameras and that several were caught photographing military objects while on a boat trip on the Neva this May.)

A July 17 Trud article "The Zionists Are Looking for New Victims" described in some detail how an Israeli "tourist" engaged in both speculation and underground Zionist activity and also how a named secretary-archivist of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow supposedly was caught disseminating anti-Soviet and Zionist propaganda and literature while on a recent trip to Kishinev. Under the heading "Love for Science? No, for Espionage", Red Star of July 22 describes the US armed forces foreign languages training programs as evidence of preparation for eventual war against the USSR and the socialist camp and for intensified espionage activity in the meantime. Otherwise involved only by implication, American military attaches were said to serve as a channel for transmitting foreign publications and periodicals back to the "so-called 'linguistic centers'" at Forts Hood, Bragg, Mead and the Pentagon.

10. Enslavement 1940 Incorporation of Baltic States Celebrated. Voluminous attention has been paid in all Soviet propaganda media to the 20th anniversary of the incorporation of the Baltin States into the USSR. To mark the occasion, joint greetings were sent by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers to the comparable bodies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As a sign of special favor, Moscow dispatched Presidium members Kuusinen to Tellin, Suslov to Vilnyus and Shvernik to Riga to attend the anniversary festivities. Generally rejoicing was said to have taken place at the memory of the events of July 20 and 21, 1940 when the "toilers" of the three small states "with the selfless assistance of the peoples of the USSR," overturned their governments and joined the USSR. The Soviet press has concurrently heaped considerable abuse on the President's Proclamation of "Captive Nations Week."

11. Graduation at Higher Party School. Pravda of July 18 reported that a regular class had recently been graduated from the Higher Party School of the CPSU Central Committee. There were reported to be 437 graduates in this class, including a "large group" from the socialist countries. Speeches are said to have been given by N. R. MITRONOV, long-time rector of the school, and P. M. POSPELOV, candidate member of the Party Presidium.
COMMENT: Although released from the CPSU Secretariat in May of this year, Pospelov appears to be continuing his long-time activities in the field of ideological indoctrination.

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